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Trust, Collaboration, and Financial Return
in Conservation/Development Partnerships
December 2003
Summary
Comments on Limited
Development
Role of the Developer
Role of the
Conservationist/Land Trust
Role of the Municipality
Trust and Risk
Financial Return
Developer
Conservationist/Land Trust
Municipality
List of Interviewees
Summary
In early 2002 the New England Environmental Finance Center hosted a
series of roundtable discussions among municipal officials,
residential developers, land trust representatives, and others about
"Innovative Approaches to Land Conservation and Smart Growth"[1].
Among our observations was that for many of the over 20
conservation/development partnerships we discussed in the series,
creation and maintenance of trust was central to success or failure of
various stages of the partnership. This suggested a link between
creation of trust and financial return for traditionally opposed
project partners.
To further examine this matter we interviewed 11 roundtable
participants and asked questions about key moments in the course of
the project where the main financial benefits or losses were realized,
and about specific behaviors (by them or others in the partnership)
that led to creation or dissolution of trust. This report describes 1)
the roles of developers, land trust representatives, and municipal
officials in projects for which interviews were conducted; 2)
behaviors project partners felt were central to creation or
dissolution of trust; and 3) particular financial benefits that were
obtained in these partnerships and that should be attainable in other
conservation/development partnerships where trust is cultivated.
Comments on Limited
Development
"Limited" or "partial" development has been identified as one method
of preserving open land when outright purchase is not an option for a
land trust or municipality. Described by one planning professional, it
is "financing the preservation of threatened property by developing a
portion of it."[2]
Once a parcel of land has been identified as having
conservation value (typically by a local land trust, community
organization, elected official, or municipal professional), these
parties work to buy or hold the parcel, sell a portion of lesser
conservation value to a developer, and sell or assign stewardship of
the remaining land to a public or nonprofit entity. Limited
developments are not necessarily "cluster" or higher density projects,
although they may have conservation easements or contract zoning
attached to restrict the type and extent of development that will be
allowed. Having a third party facilitate the process is often critical
for time-sensitive negotiations, especially because buying,
conserving, selling, and stewardship arrangements tend to occur
simultaneously and amidst the threat of conventional development.
Also described as "compromise development," limited development
balances the need to preserve "sensitive" land and accommodate growth[3];
it thus requires financially risky collaboration between parties that
have not historically worked together. Though road maps for such
collaborations are difficult to come by, at least one author has
offered specific guidelines for land trusts working with landowners to
create limited development plans[4].
It is the goal of this report to provide additional guidelines for
those involved in such partnerships, as a context-specific supplement
to traditional literature on mutual-gains negotiation[5].
Role of the Developer
In the limited development projects studied, developer actions that
led to project success included readiness to negotiate, outreach to
affected parties, maintaining a cooperative attitude, and generating
support from diverse parts of the community. Some developers were
additionally willing to accept project constraints and para-regulatory
requirements, and to persevere over extended project timelines. When
developers pursued non-conservation oriented options while limited
development options were being discussed, trust was undermined.
Examples of developer behavior in support of a collaborative
partnership included:
·
opening one's books to all involved in order to show financial details
of the project;
·
meeting to discuss a project with a known opponent
in order to establish rapport and
defuse antagonism;
·
taking a property off the market to allow time for grants and funding
sources to be arranged in support of a limited development option;
·
incorporating feedback from project abutters;
·
bringing a large-scale development proposal (for example for a "big
box" retailer), allowed under ordinance, to the table
in order to spark conversation and
compromise, and challenge negative attitudes toward a limited
development project; and
·
hiring a third-party mediator to help with negotiations.
The land trust typically sees itself in the role of keeper of the
community's vision for conservation. In the case
of expensive land, some conservationists found it in their best
interest to partner with a developer to conserve sizeable portions of
a parcel, rather than do nothing or attempt to purchase the land
outright on the open market. The most successful role in these cases
was described by behaviors that accommodated development within the
overall framework of conservation goals for the community. Behaviors
that fostered these partnerships included:
·
identifying critical parcels of land;
·
presenting (to a municipality or developer) limited development
options compatible with land conservation;
·
establishing compromise positions; and
·
bringing together wide coalitions in support of particular projects.
Extreme tactics (such as derision in the press) and not involving
relevant stakeholders undermined several otherwise effective
conservation-oriented project proposals. Because acquiring funds,
changing zoning ordinances, and working with project complexities
tended to protract project timetables, being patient was also a most
constructive behavior. Other helpful behaviors included:
·
proactively presenting a developer with a conservation-oriented option
for a valuable parcel of land;
·
identifying the balance between the conservation agenda and the
development strategy in the acquisition of a key parcel;
·
asking the developer for an outright donation of the land, to get the
topic of conservation on the table.
·
spearheading the public relations campaign for a limited development
project by inviting the press to see the property and using regular
news releases to keep the project in the public eye;
·
aggressively advocating for a limited development project with the
local planning board and legislative body in order to overcome trust
issues within the community.
·
aggressively recruiting participation from other conservation groups
in order to secure political support and grant money at the earliest
possible point;
·
engaging in persistent outreach and communication in order to keep a
project on track (e.g., following up meetings with calls, writing
letters, and meeting face to face); and
Many municipalities have struggled to incorporate conservation goals
into comprehensive planning and zoning regulations, because public
pressure to preserve land occasionally conflicts with long-term
economic interests of the community. To balance fiscal and
environmental needs, several municipal officials interviewed met with
representatives from various interests to establish guidelines for a
negotiated proposal development process. They subsequently crafted
ordinances and zoning variances that created developer incentives for
the preservation of open space. The most supportive role for the
municipality was thus defined by mediative behaviors and setting the
stage for effective negotiation. Extreme tactics, such as the threat
of eminent domain or using the zoning variance process to extract
concessions from developers and land trusts, were seen to erode
partnership opportunities. When a municipality created excessive
guidelines for project implementation, some limited development
projects became uneconomical and could not proceed.
Examples of constructive, process-oriented behavior included:
·
Evaluating the relative merits of competing proposals (typical vs.
limited development) for the same parcel side by side, in order to
dramatize public benefit.
·
Taking the role of lead educator in promoting the benefits of
conservation-oriented development.
·
Negotiating a compromise between a developer's proposal for narrower
roads and the public works/public safety departments' desire for
standard road width, by assessing the developer a fee equal to his
cost savings for use in creating a town park or other public amenity.
·
Brokering the design of a conservation easement and hunting
restrictions in exchange for limited development on remaining portions
of parcel.
·
Openly supporting projects with a strong open space component in order
to defuse political pressure and secure funding.
Trust and Risk
For conservation/development partnerships to be effective, each
partner must perceive clear benefits of their involvement. Each
partner has a threshold for considering a project to be a "good deal;"
developers and landowners seek maximum financial outcomes; land trusts
seek the greatest amount of valued land in permanent protection (and,
at the same time, cannot afford doing projects for free); and
municipalities seek efficiency of land use and scarce financial
resources. The key to successful partnering lies in achieving
individual thresholds in tandem with other participants. Ensuring this
result requires trust among project partners.
Although trust is not easy to quantify, it is manifest in a variety of
tangible benefits that serve as adequate proxies. For the land trust,
mutual confidence may result in its acquiring a parcel that might
otherwise be unobtainable; being involved in a process that might
otherwise be closed; and increasing membership in its service area.
Collateral benefits of trust also impact the municipality, which can
see a less divisive public process of deliberation, and higher levels
of engagement in planning and public policymaking. For the developer,
following the path of least resistance (seeking approval of projects
that simply meet requirements of traditional ordinances) may appear to
be optimal, but may not be so in situations where collaboration with
conservation interests can increase density on developed portions of a
parcel.
However, developers increasingly perceive the approval process to be
unpredictable, and have a sense that many current planning and
development standards have hidden costs. One impact of this can be
initial mistrust between developers and the municipality. To counter
this, several developers noted that being involved in partnerships
with strong conservation elements can improve a developer's image in
the community and enhance future business opportunities. They also
suggested that the mutual confidence resulting from collaboration with
conservation groups can dramatically increase likelihood of success
for any given project.
Risks inherent to such partnerships are considerable, however. If a
partnership fails to result in adequate profits or protected land,
participants may feel their investments were wasted. Each potential
partner has a threshold for risk; each must weigh the
potential consequences of trying to collaborate and failing versus
continuing with the status quo. Importantly, though, individuals are
not without means to influence the magnitude of tolerable risk in a
collaborative effort. Several veterans of
successful conservation/development partnerships mentioned they felt
it was necessary to change their own behavior in order to change the
system or the pattern within which they were operating. Indeed, our
interviews suggest that in a majority of cases, benefits of
cultivating conservation/development partnerships will outweigh risks,
provided the individuals entering the partnerships are willing to
change their own behavior, rather than looking for changes among other
parties.
Financial Return
In any limited development project, there is a given amount of
potential money to be generated; the difference in projects involving
collaborative partnerships is the size of that "pot" and its
distribution[6].
For example, in one limited development project we examined in Rhode
Island, developers and the land trust were able to find common
interest in the land. As a result, the land trust was able to preserve
142 acres of a 174-acre parcel at a cost of $1.2 M. The developers
paid $1.6 M for the remaining 32 acres. Together they defined the
conservation goals and established criteria for the new development.
In return, the developer obtained both financial benefit from the
proximity of his project to a conservation area and political benefit
from improving his image and working relationship with the
municipality. The land trust preserved the bulk of the parcel,
including the most geologically significant areas.
In a conventional development, the land owner and developer are
typically the only parties who make money. The municipality may see a
negative fiscal impact through the increase in infrastructure costs
associated with low-density developments, without a commensurate
increase in property tax revenues. The land trust may consider the
loss of land to conventional development an opportunity cost to the
community. In contrast, in a collaborative partnership on a
conservation/development project, the expectation is that funds to be
generated will increase and benefits will accrue to all parties. When
this occurs it can be referred to as the "realization of latent
financial interests" which, we argue, is a trust-based result.
In the partnerships we examined, several specific financial benefits
were obtained through trusting the collaborative process. It is our
view that these results will be attainable in other
conservation-development partnerships where trust is cultivated. By
role, these benefits are as follows:
·
Permitting processes may be shorter (and associated expenses fewer)
when it is in a land trust's interest to see the project approved. In
more than one instance that we observed, the trust successfully
approached the municipality to speak on behalf of a project.
·
Being conservation-minded and cooperative may lead to better
reputation and increase in business.
·
Changing the development scheme from a parcel purchased and developed
with standard zoning to a parcel with a conservation easement and
higher density may result in a higher profit margin.
·
Defusing opposition and antagonism may lead to fewer lawsuits, which
may reduce overhead.
·
Reducing outlays for purchases of complete parcels may
reduce costs.
·
Reputation and influence of land trust may be improved in the
community, leading to an increase in dues-paying members and donors to
the land trust (which may even include developers).
·
Cost of human resources may be lower in situations where major
conflicts over a development do not emerge. Land trusts will be more
able to focus on long-term goals than having to put out brush fires.
·
Collaboration with other conservationist interests may lead to an
increase in grant funding.
· Use
of infrastructure will be more efficient.
·
Property tax revenues will more adequately cover service expenses in
cluster developments.
·
Costs of human resources may be lower in situations where extended
conflict over a project is avoided. Planners and elected officials
will be able to focus on long-term public interests instead of
fighting developments in potential conservation areas.
·
The community as a whole may take a greater interest in public
participation in planning, meaning that developments may better
reflect financial and other needs of the citizenry.
List of Interviewees
|
Contact |
Project
Location |
Association |
Role |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Richard
Berman |
Falmouth, ME |
Berman
Associates |
Developer |
|
Eric
Chindburg |
Durham, NH |
Chindberg
Builders |
Developer |
|
Ted Clement
|
Aquidneck
Island, RI |
Aquidneck
Island Land Trust |
Conservationist |
|
Nan Cumming
|
Portland, ME |
Portland
Trails |
Conservationist |
|
Peter Dow
|
Exeter, NH |
Town of
Exeter |
Municipal Official |
|
Peter Hughes
|
Marlborough,
CT |
Town of
Marlborough |
Municipal Official |
|
Al Lima
|
New Bedford,
MA |
Town of New
Bedford |
Municipal Official |
|
Bob Linck
|
Craftsbury,
VT |
Vermont Land
Trust |
Conservationist |
|
Frank Stewart
|
Sudbury, MA |
Northland
Residential Corporation |
Developer |
|
Shep Spear
|
Georgetown,
MA |
Camelot
Realty Trust |
Developer |
|
Harvey Perry |
Westerly, RI |
Westerly Land
Trust |
Conservationist |
[3]
Malamut, J.
(1987). Compromise Development: Bridging the Gap between
Development and Preservation. Urban Land Magazine, March.
Urban Land Institute.
[4]
Pitz, A. D.
(1988). Helping Landowners Implement Limited Development Projects.
Exchange, The Journal of The Land Trust Exchange, Fall. San
Francisco: The Trust for Public Land.
[5]
e.g., Susskind, L., and
J. Cruikshank. 1989. Breaking The Impasse: Consensual Approaches
to Resolving Public Disputes. Basic Books, New York, NY;
Fisher, R. W. Ury, and B. Patton. 1991. Getting To Yes:
Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Second edition. Penguin
Books, New York, NY; and Arrow, K., R. Mnookin, L. Ross, A.
Tversky, and R. Wilson, eds. 1995. Barriers to Conflict
Resolution. W.W. Norton, New York, NY.
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